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I remember when I lived in another city different from the one that is now my home, I was told that in order to protect the family at night and sleep in peace I must purchase a dog. I was not so familiar then with canine proclivities as I have become since, and I invested in a bulldog of ferocious mien and enormous development of the under jaw. For a few days all went well, but I soon found that that bulldog must have something to do. He was not content to sit like a china doll on the front step; he was there for a purpose. One morning, hearing a great uproar, I looked out of the window, and saw the street filled with people standing in a circle, while one of the most venerable men in the community was defending himself with a shovel against that dog of mine. He had torn away the man's coat and was proceeding to attack the nether garments and the limbs when I interfered, and prevented a lawsuit. I made up my mind then that the way to keep the peace is not to place a bulldog in your front yard. [Applause.]

There is another thing that our college men are coming to feel. They are beginning to believe in a newer and finer heroism, which shall give all the development to the audacity and pluck and virility of human nature that war has given, without its sad consequences, its inevitable sorrow. We all love the hero, and we ought to love him; we all love the man that is willing to sacrifice ease and pleasure and life itself for a vocation, and we ought to admire him, and that admiration must never disappear from civilization. All admire the Japanese soldier willing to fling his life away for his Mikado and ancestors. Whether we can understand the service or not, we admire it. But our college men are coming to see that giving one's self for the relief of woe and want, relief of the destitution and sorrow and misery of humanity as we know it in the modern world, requires just as much courage and audacity and pluck and self-sacrifice. I believe they are finding this out. They are finding out that there is the hero not only at the cannon's mouth,—and there is the hero there, and we all acknowledge it,—but also in Arnold Toynbee, sacrificing his life in two short years in service for the poor of East London. We acknowledge the heroism in the life of that brave young American physician who banished yellow fever from Cuba and from the United States, and laid down his brave young life in the attempt. We remember with admiration the heroism of W. T. Norton, when he placed the sponge filled with ether to his nostrils and sank into unconsciousness, that might have been death, for the first time in human history, in order to relieve the world of suffering and pain. We are finding that the heroism of our educated young men and women is exhibited in the life of Jane Addams and Graham Taylor, who have buried themselves for the rest of their lives in the slums of the great western city. This is the kind of genuine heroism that will give the finest fibre of the young manhood and young womanhood of our time all the development it needs. Let us exalt equally the heroes of our great industrial, commercial and social endeavor. Let us not cast disparagement on our great military men of the past, but let us enhance the value of international arbitration, the parliament of man and the federation of the world.

Governor Utter, one of the best executives we have

ever had in Rhode Island, went home from this Conference last year full of enthusiasm to do something for college men. At our commencement dinner he asked us if we would take a prize, if he should offer it, for the best debate on this subject and the best essay. I said, "Certainly." He said, "It is to be called the Mohonk prize for the best debate on this subject and the best essay." A few months later we had a debate superior to anything else in interest that we had during the year, and the Attorney-General of the State told me that some of the essays presented, while they might not revolutionize the world, were well worth reading and well worth preserving. Each one of us as we go home may not offer Mohonk prizes, but we may spread the Mohonk influence and inspiration. We can cause something to be done in our own community to spread the influence of the Conference. A similar prize of one hundred dollars was given by Governor Utter to Amherst College in the same way. I doubt not the results there have been equally valuable.

So, Mr. Chairman, I beg leave to move that we accept the report so informing and suggestive and inspiring of Dr. Gilman, and that we continue this same committee for another year to push this work among the college men and women of America.

Constitutional Safeguards Against War.

ADDRESS OF DR. ERNST RICHARD OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

No less a person than Immanuel Kant has prophesied that war will end when all nations have become republics or have representative governments.

All nations of European civilization have reached the stage of representative government, but his prophecy has not come true. It is therefore of interest to see whether, by their constitution, they show any willingness to prevent war or make it at least more difficult.

An investigation shows that in a number of states the right to declare war without any limitation is vested in the monarch. This cannot be considered as a proof that they intend any reform of ancient customs. The only limitation which is common to all nations that have a constitutional government is found in the right of the Parliament to appropriate the necessary funds for the military and naval establishments and the means of carrying on war. These, however, cannot be refused after the king has made use of his constitutional right and has declared war. It may be said in general that all these limitations are rather intended to be manifestations of sovereignty than safeguards against war.

Of two constitutions which are looked upon as very liberal, the Belgian says (Art. 68): "The King shall command the land and naval forces, make treaties of peace, of alliance, of commerce; he shall give information in respect of the foregoing matters to the two houses as soon as the interest and safety of the state permit it, joining therewith the corresponding communication."

The other constitution referred to is that of Norway. This demands of the King of Norway to advise the Council of State in order to get information about the defensive strength of the country.

The list of states which do not give the executive power, be it monarch or president, the absolute right to declare war may be opened with Germany, whose constitution does not give the Emperor this right except in case of an attack on boundaries or territories of the confederation or its coasts; otherwise, for declaration of war in the name of the empire the consent of the federal council shall be required. In this the Emperor as such has no vote; Prussia, of which he is king, has seventeen votes out of fifty-four.

In most states the power to declare war is vested in Congress, or by whatever name the corresponding bodies are called, giving in some instances the president the authority to do so only with the consent of the Congress; in others the initiative seems to rest entirely with the representatives of the people. In some cases an exception is made by a provision like that in the German constitution; as, for instance, in Colombia, where the President of the republic as the chief executive officer for the nation has the power to declare war with the consent of the Senate, or to do it without such consent whenever it shall be necessary to repel a foreign invasion.

The Colombia constitution, as we see, may serve also as an illustration of those states who give the power of declaring war to one House of Congress only, as a rule to the upper House.

Peculiar is the position of Mexico, where either of the Houses without the intervention of the other may declare war in view of the data which the executive may present, which permits the President to choose the one which is sure to give him the majority.

In the most democratic of all constitutions, that of Switzerland, the President, who in reality is only the chairman of the council, has no part at all in the declaration of war or in the conclusion of peace, which is invested entirely in parliament. As far as the declaration of war is concerned, this agrees with our own constitution, which, however, does not authorize anybody to conclude peace, except as we include it by implication in the treaty power of the President and the Senate.

It will be easily seen that in all these constitutions the intention to make war difficult was not a leading point of view. There are, however, three constitutions which show a tendency against war in a more or less pronounced way. These are, of course, of special interest to us. Of this number, Ecuador holds a position by itself. Here where the executive has the power to declare war when previously decreed by Congress, the President is held responsible for *provoking* an unjust war. This seems a rather wise provision, considering that by the actions of the President a situation may be created which leaves the Congress no choice but to declare war.

The principle of arbitration finds recognition in Venezuela, whose constitution demands, in Article 109, that in international treaties of commerce and friendship this clause shall be inserted: "All disagreements between the contracting parties must be decided without an appeal to war, by the decision of a friendly power or powers."

The most interesting document in this respect is the constitution of Brazil. Article 88 of this constitution

says: "In no case, either directly or indirectly, alone or in alliance with another nation, shall the United States of Brazil engage in a war of conquest;" while Article 48 gives the President of the republic the right to declare war at once in case of foreign invasion or aggression. We find, however, that Article 34 says: "The National Congress shall have exclusive power to authorize the government to declare war, if there be no opportunity for arbitration, or, in case of failure of this, to make peace." The constitution of Brazil at once shows the good faith of the nation in its assertions of peacefulness. Thus the government of Brazil answered the invitation extended to it to be represented at the Hague Conference, that there was no necessity for it to do so, as Brazil had anticipated all the conference could do, by making the appeal to arbitration a constitutional duty, and as to its army, it had decreased it already and had sold most of its warships.

No matter what we may read about the internal conditions of the South American Republics, so far as this subject is concerned they have taken decidedly greater steps in civilization than other nations.

We want the United States of America to take the lead in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and to extend the empire of law by strengthening the appreciation of international justice. Could this be done in a more efficient way and shown in a plainer manner than by inserting a similar provision in our own constitution?

I am fully aware that it is considered almost foolhardy to propose an amendment to the United States constitution, although it may be a question of meeting conditions unheard of at the time of its adoption, or of progressive measures not thought of at that period.

This is the case with arbitration, the modest beginning of whose modern development took place only with the Jay Treaty in 1794. To-day an amendment of that kind would mean a lasting gain to civilization, a blessing for all time to come in view of the fact that generation after generation might benefit by it.

Even the number of years it may take to show our people of what advantage such an amendment would be seems of small amount. The continuous agitation connected with an effort for introducing such an amendment would bring the questions involved to the conscience of every citizen and the principles we advocate into every home.

If this fundamental principle of international civilization and organization, with its everlasting benefit, does not seem important enough to warrant the hardships of a campaign for a constitutional amendment, why not try a joint resolution of Congress, which, I am sure, would never be revoked?

I do not think that technical difficulties should prevent us from doing a great service to our country and to all humanity. Of course, there are those who will doubt whether it would be doing a service to our country to compel our government and Congress to give passion time to quiet down, to give justice a chance to be heard, before the nation were rushed into the calamity of war.

It will be said that we cannot tie our hands in this manner. But does not every arbitration treaty as we advocate it involve such a tying of hands? Can we by adopting the principle of arbitration in this manner tie

our hands so as to prevent justice? What harm can it do if time is gained to consider the real causes of our dispute with another nation or to find means of doing justice without the resort to arms?

I do not say that there may not be good reasons to keep the plans and proceedings of our diplomacy secret, but I think a democratic nation has a right to see that it is not rushed or forced into war by its government without knowing that all efforts toward peaceful settlement have been in vain. And this can be secured most effectively in the manner proposed.

The objections made by the opponents of compulsory arbitration at the Hague Tribunal seem to be no other than these two, namely, that arbitration had not been tested sufficiently to be unreservedly adopted, and the claim that there were certain points of national honor which nobody would leave to a third party to decide.

I do not understand why a nation should not submit questions of honor to a tribunal of its equals as well as an individual. In this case the tribunal of arbitration would not be a court of justice, but a court of honor. In those countries where individual war in the shape of the duel has survived to the present day, the first step toward its limitation—and, let us hope, final abolishment—is a demand to have the question at issue submitted to a court of honor, either permanently established or appointed for the purpose, which has to decide whether the honor of the offended party is at stake and whether it is important enough to warrant a fight for life or death. Why should not nations do the same? How much would not be gained if nations would submit similar cases to a court of honor, which, certainly, would be able to prevent in many cases the outbreak of a war, while wisdom and reason had time to raise their voices and wise leaders of the nation to make them “bethink themselves.”

I have brought this question before you, not because I hope to be able to persuade you into a declaration in its favor, or even desire to do so, but simply because I think it is important enough to be discussed by you and by the wisest men of the nation. I believe it is worth while to find out whether there are serious objections to the principle. I must confess I have been unable to find any. But let the opponents bring forth their arguments. Let them be examined without prejudice. But if, after careful investigation, we should come to the conclusion that, by making the duty of an appeal to arbitration before declaring war, except in case of actual attack on our boundaries or our coasts, the highest law of the land, we shall not put ourselves at a disadvantage in any right and just cause. We should not hesitate to show our good faith by adopting this course and by showing the way to all mankind, let alone the direct benefit we and our descendants would gain by making it impossible to drive our country into an unjust war.

It is said that treaties will be broken, that mutual distrust between nations will never cease. Still we keep on hoping for new treaties. We expect complete salvation through the action of the Hague Conference. If we really believe in arbitration as a means of international justice, it is our sacred duty to begin ourselves with its establishment. We are strong enough to defy distrust; let us be generous enough to disarm distrust. From the moment we declare that we will not allow

any dispute to which we are a party to end in war without trying to settle it by arbitration first, that we will make this an absolute law for our representatives, we shall need no treaties. No nation will refuse to accept our law as its own; no nation will dare to choose arms if we offer justice.

What the Last Year Has Won for Us.

ADDRESS OF A. B. FARQUHAR.

Mr. Chairman: While we know of nothing in the future of which we may be more certain than the final triumph of our sacred cause, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, there is nothing more uncertain than the attempt to show the progress made from year to year—to prove from the events of an immediately preceding twelvemonth that we are nearer to our goal at its close than we were when it began. Had such an annual trial-balancing been undertaken two years ago, for example, when the most conspicuous object on the wide horizon was a colossal war in the East, which had already shown itself to be fearfully destructive and at that time threatened to be of long continuance, then the result would have been discouraging indeed. Now, however, our prospect is altogether different. Within a year the bloody war in Eastern Asia has given place to a peace which promises to be permanent, because of the care and wise moderation with which its provisions were finally drawn; not only that, but that peace was brought about in a way that holds out an excellent promise of application to disagreements between nations in the future. After the treaty of Portsmouth, the event of the year ranking next in importance was the convention of Algeciras, another important instance of a settlement of international differences by pacific methods.

Neither in composing the quarrel between Japan and Russia, as was done so successfully in New Hampshire at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, nor in the Algeciras agreement, was direct use made of the apparatus devised by the Conference of 1899 at The Hague. It must be admitted that the Hague Tribunal, constituted though it was for the very purpose of settling misunderstandings among nations, applicable though it is to any case that may arise, and highly qualified though it may be made to the full measure of the character that the governments forming it are disposed to impress upon it, has nevertheless been too much neglected. Yet the same impulse that was felt in the formation of that tribunal is plainly to be recognized in the agreements that have been reached without recourse to it; and we may therefore be assured that the work at The Hague was by no means wasted.

It is evident, however, that matters must not merely be left to take their own course, either at home or abroad, if we would have the advance steps, upon which we now congratulate ourselves, followed by more and larger strides in the same direction. It is a great triumph that the Russian and Japanese empires should have been brought from the bitterest antagonism to an enduring peace, through the courteous but courageous efforts of the chief of a republic. It is a new triumph when, amid the entanglements arising from the conflicting interests of many nations, a solution of the Moroccan problem should be found in which all of them have freely agreed